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Protecting the Border, One Passenger
Interrogation at a Time
INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, represented the ultimate intersection between criminal
and immigration law. Because many of the terrorists had
entered the United States legally with visas issued by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),1 the tragedy
revealed the deficiencies in the administration of laws that
provided for entry into the United States.2 Thus, in the years
following September 11, immigration policy has been
transformed3 to ensure that persons who have not been
properly screened and verified are not allowed to remain in the
country.4 That transformation has included a greater
criminalization of immigration violations5 as “illegal immigrants
have come to be seen as synonymous with terrorists.”6 The new
priorities of immigration agencies and authorities have become
to restrict admission and increase deportations with the
purported goal of rooting out terrorists and increasing the
security of the nation.7
1 See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
ENTRY OF THE 9/11 HIJACKERS INTO THE UNITED STATES, STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1, at 4
(2004) [hereinafter STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1], available at http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/staff_statement_1.pdf (“Beginning in 1997, the 19
hijackers submitted 24 applications and received 23 visas.”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 218, 226 (2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
911/report/911Report.pdf.
2 See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 80-82.
3 See STAFF STATEMENT NO. 1, supra note 1, at 3 (“Our immigration system
before 9/11 focused primarily on keeping individuals intending to immigrate from
improperly entering the United States.”); see also Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided
Prevention: The War on Terror as a War on Immigrant Offenders and Immigration
Violators, 40 CRIM. L. BULL., no. 6, at 5 (2004) (noting that in mid-2001, fighting
terrorism was not INS’s main concern).
4 See generally Demleitner, supra note 3.
5 Id. at 2.
6 JULIE FARNAM, US IMMIGRATION LAWS UNDER THE THREAT OF TERRORISM
18 (2005).
7 Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1. “Because of the focus on foreign terrorism,
immigration law has become a major investigatory and enforcement tool on the
frontline in the fight against terrorism.” Id.
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Charged with fighting terrorism and increasing
homeland security, immigration agencies and officials have
seen their power strengthened and expanded. For years,
immigration agents have been routinely boarding domestic
trains and buses traveling within one hundred miles of the
border and interrogating passengers about their citizenship
status and requesting their immigration paperwork.8 Agents
have arrested and detained thousands of passengers that did
not have their immigration paperwork.9 Individuals who were
detained were sent either to detention facilities or local prisons
and county jails, and most were held there until they were able
to post a bond.10
This purportedly legal practice—the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) allows immigration officials to
interrogate anyone they suspect of being an illegal alien11—
actually goes far beyond what Congress intended. Congress
gave officials the authority to interrogate individuals in this
way at the border, or close to the border, because of the greater
need to investigate entrants into the United States.12 Instead,
immigration officials have been using the authority of the INA
to question and arrest passengers on domestic vessels that
have not crossed a border and will not be crossing a border.13
Further, the explanation of fighting terrorism and arresting
recently entered illegal immigrants cannot be justified by this
practice, as “the vast majority of those arrested . . . had been in
8 Nina Bernstein, Border Sweeps in North Reach Miles into U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/
nyregion/30border.html; Karen Branch-Brioso, Border Patrol Checks Bus Boarders,
TAMPA TRIB. (May 4, 2008), http://www2.tbo.com/content/2008/may/04/040011/naborder-patrol-checks-bus-boarders-bus-riders-hi/; see also Kirk Semple, Report Faults
Border Patrol on Bus and Train Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A27, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/09/nyregion/border-patrol-searches-faulted-in-newreport.html?_r=1.
9 Bernstein, supra note 8; N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, FAMILIES FOR
FREEDOM & NYU SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC, JUSTICE DERAILED: WHAT
RAIDS ON NEW YORK’S TRAINS AND BUSES REVEAL ABOUT BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR
ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES 1, 4 (2011) [hereinafter NYCLU REPORT], available at
http://www.nyclu.org/publications/report-justice-derailed-what-raids-trains-and-busesreveal-about-border-patrols-interi. “[N]early all individuals arrested during
transportation raids are detained by CBP without being screened for risk of flight,
threat to the community, or other considerations . . . regardless of whether they are
recent entrants apprehended at the border or have resided in the United States for
years.” Id. at 14.
10 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15.
11 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2006).
12 See infra Part II.A (discussing the “border-search exception,” which allows
officials greater leeway in investigating individuals when they arrive from outside the
U.S. specifically because they are coming from outside the country).
13 Bernstein, supra note 8.
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the country for more than one year,” and many had been in the
country for more than three years.14
Immigration officials violate the Fourth Amendment
when they interrogate random passengers in this way. In the
seminal Fourth Amendment case Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme
Court laid out the parameters of police officers’ authority.15 The
Court specifically stated that a seizure occurs when a police
officer “restrains” an individual’s ability to “walk away.”16 An
officer who has seized an individual must have reasonable
suspicion to justify the intrusion.17 The practice at issue here is
a coercive display of police authority that constitutes a seizure,
because the passengers do not feel free to refuse to respond.18
Under Terry and the Court’s subsequent cases further defining
a “seizure,”19 immigration officers must have reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to carry out their investigations.
This practice directly results from the post-September
11 expansion in immigration officials’ powers, which gives
agents unprecedented authority under the official purpose of
fighting terrorism.20 However, the post-September 11 policies
have resulted in almost no arrests for the actual crime of
terrorism.21 On the other hand, the lives of individuals who
have been in the United States for years have been
unjustifiably disturbed; in many instances, the consequences
for individuals questioned during these transportation checks
are dire, since the INA permits mandatory detention for

NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 8-9; see also Bernstein, supra note 8.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
16 See id. at 16.
17 See id. at 20-21.
18 See infra Part III.A; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
552 (1980) (“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has
occurred.”).
19 See infra Part III.A.
20 See infra Part I.
21 DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 232-34
(3d ed. 2006) (The authors note that “the war on terrorism, at least at home, has netted
almost no actual terrorists.” Specifically, the authors write that although “[t]he Justice
Department boasts that its terrorism investigations have led to more than 300 criminal
indictments [and] over 100 convictions,” the vast majority of those convictions have been
“for minor charges, not terrorism.” Further, “few of the government’s indictments charge
actual terrorism.”); see also Demleitner, supra note 3, at 1 (“[S]o far these special measures
have yielded few tangible results.”); CONSTITUTION PROJECT, THE USE AND ABUSE OF
IMMIGRATION AUTHORITY AS A COUNTERTERRORISM TOOL: CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2008), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/
Immigration_Authority_As_A_Counterterrorism_Tool.pdf (“As the bipartisan 9/11
Commission’s staff found, there is no evidence that the post-September 11 immigration
initiatives targeted at Arabs and Muslims succeeded in identifying any actual terrorists.”).
14
15
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individuals with questionable status22 and possibly immediate
deportation without judicial review.23 These actions are
troubling because the courts,24 the INA,25 and the current
administration recognize that some immigrants, even those in
the country illegally, deserve certain protections. Recently, the
Obama administration has stated that it will focus on
deporting convicted criminals and individuals who pose
national security risks rather than illegal immigrants with no
criminal records.26 Additionally, Senator Richard J. Durbin has
sponsored legislation called the Development, Relief, and
Education for Alien Minors Act of 2010 (the DREAM Act) that
would provide a path to citizenship for certain young illegal
immigrants who came to the United States as children.27 Thus,
the Obama administration and even members of Congress have
recognized that although individuals may be in the country
illegally, their ties to the United States may afford them
greater protection from intrusion and seizure than first-time
entrants or suspected terrorists.

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2006).
See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at
58 (2007), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/AR_2007/annualreport2007.pdf.
24 Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized that individuals who have
resided in the United States for some time are entitled to more procedural protections
than first-time entrants. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien
gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903) (holding that an illegal alien, who “has become subject in all
respects to” the jurisdiction of the United States and has become “a part of its
population,” is entitled to some due process protections).
25 The INA’s cancellation of removal procedures are arguably a recognition by
Congress that individuals who have lived in the U.S. for many years and have
established ties to the country may, in certain instances, gain permanent resident
status and repose. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
26 Julia Preston, U.S. to Review Cases Seeking Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/us/deportation-cases-ofillegal-immigrants-to-be-reviewed.html?_r=1&hp. In particular, this would indefinitely
delay the deportation of individuals who entered the country illegally as children (and
thus did not make the original choice to immigrate) and have since spent their lives in
the United States Robert Pear, Fewer Youths to Be Deported in New Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/us/
19immig.html?pagewanted=all. For one immigrant’s personal account of coming to the
United States as a child and living with no legal status, see Jose Antonio Vargas, My Life
as an Undocumented Immigrant, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2011, (Magazine), at MM22,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/26/magazine/my-life-as-anundocumented-immigrant.html?_r=1&src=ISMR_HP_LO_MST_FB.
27 David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Blocks Bill for Young Illegal Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/19/us/politics/
19immig.html?sq=DREAM%20act&st=cse&adxnnl=1&scp=1&adxnnlx=1293375627zGDKC/ZXQgn3ztzRZoOO5g. The Senate voted down the bill, in a vote by 55-41 in
favor of the bill. Id.
22
23
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In November 2011, three immigrant rights groups—the
New York Civil Liberties Union, Families for Freedom, and the
Immigrant Rights Clinic at New York University School of
Law—released a report examining data of arrests that occurred
during these “transportation raids” in upstate New York.28 The
report found that these document checks “do little to protect
the border, but they threaten constitutional protections that
apply to citizens and non-citizens alike.”29 In particular, the
authors concluded that the majority of those arrested and
detained were not recent border-crossers, agents violated
“established arrest procedures,” and anecdotal reports
indicated that officers used racial profiling to pick out the
individuals stopped and questioned.30 The report advocated
ending this practice and putting in place more constitutional
and procedural protections.31
In fact, the Border Patrol has taken some action to scale
back the amount of random transportation checks that occur.
In October 2011, the agency ordered field offices that were not
near the southwest border to conduct checks in train and bus
stations and airports only when “they have specific ‘actionable
intelligence’ that there is an illegal immigrant there who
recently entered the country.”32 However, this order “has not
been made public,” and, as stated by a spokesman for the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, “does not amount to a change
in policy.”33 Additionally, Border Patrol Agents and their union,
the National Border Patrol Council, have criticized the move.34
The union stated that the reduction in the number of
transportation checks has “handcuff[ed] the effectiveness of
Border Patrol agents.”35 The union also alluded ominously to
the September 11 attacks and stated, “A decade ago nineteen
illegal aliens overstayed visas . . . which resulted in nearly
3,000 Americans losing their lives. This lesson must be lost on
NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9.
Id. at 1.
30 Id. at 2.
31 Id. at 25.
32 U.S. Relaxes Canadian Border Checks as Agents Are Told to Stop
Searching Buses, Trains and Planes for Illegal Immigrants, MAIL ONLINE (Oct. 30,
2011,
2:25
PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2055204/US-relaxesCanadian-border-checks-Routine-bus-train-plane-searches-stopped.html.
33 Id.
34 Id.; Press Release, Nat’l Border Patrol Council, Border Patrol Curtails
Transportation Checks with Increased Bureaucracy (Oct. 27, 2011) [hereinafter NBPC
Press Release], available at http://www.nbpc.net/index.php?option=com_content&
task=view&id=367&Itemid=1.
35 NBPC Press Release, supra note 34.
28
29
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those running the Border Patrol in Washington.”36 Thus,
although there has been a shift away from using transportation
checks on domestic bus and train routes, no formal or official
order has ended the practice, and there has been backlash.
As evident from the National Border Patrol Council’s
statement, illegal immigrants are still closely associated with
terrorists, and until there is permanent action to curb the
practice of transportation checks, they may continue to be used
at any time. Therefore, Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), the agency responsible for border
security and the training of Border Patrol agents, must take
official action to curtail this practice. Congress should amend
the INA to permit Border Patrol agents to question individuals
only when they have reasonable, particularized suspicion that
the passenger is either in the country illegally or may be a
terrorist, and the DHS should provide ongoing training to its
agents on administering this standard.
This note will analyze the Border Patrol’s interrogation
of passengers on domestic vessels under the Fourth
Amendment and border search jurisprudence, and it will argue
that the practice is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, this practice must be curtailed. Part I
will discuss the structure of immigration authority and
immigration law in the United States, including the changes in
that structure after the September 11 attacks. Part II will
discuss the law that defines the parameters of searches at the
border and analyze whether this practice is illegal under that
framework. Part III will discuss the general search and seizure
law after Terry and argue that random requests for
immigration documents of passengers on domestic vessels is
both unconstitutional and based on unsound policy. Part IV
will propose an amendment to the INA to curb this practice
and a refinement of DHS training policy that would permit
officers to question passengers only when they have
individualized, reasonable suspicion to believe that the
passenger is either an illegal alien or a terrorist.
Although protecting the nation from terrorism is an
imperative objective, the Border Patrol’s interrogation of
domestic passengers does nothing to further that goal. On the
other hand, this practice violates passengers’ personal liberties
in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. Because it is

36

Id.
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unconstitutional and ineffective, Congress and the DHS should
limit Border Patrol agents’ authority.
I.

CHANGES IN IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY AS A
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Even before the attacks on September 11, Congress
made changes to immigration law to deter and penalize illegal
immigration.37 After September 11, however, the connection
between immigration and terrorism became explicit and
Congress acted to strengthen the police powers of immigration
officials by increasing funds, personnel,38 and the jurisdiction in
which they could interrogate and detain individuals suspected
of being illegal immigrants.39 The changes in immigration law
and policy after September 11 have led to the current policy of
randomly stopping, interrogating, and detaining passengers on
common carriers travelling on routes exclusively within the
United States.
A.

Immigration Law Prior to September 11, 2001

Before the massive changes wrought by the terrorist
attacks on September 11, immigration officials were responsible
for regulating “travel, entry, and immigration” into the United
States.40 Congress charged the INS, the primary agency
overseeing immigration, principally with preventing individuals
from entering the country illegally41 and working in the United
States without authorization.42 Although the INS had a staff of
about “9,000 Border patrol agents, 4,500 inspectors, and 2,000
immigration special agents,”43 the job function of these
individuals was not framed in the context of national security.44
Instead, the INS had responsibility for the “controlled entry” of
temporary visitors and the administration of programs that
allowed non-citizens to become naturalized or to gain
See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
39 See infra Part I.C.
40 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 383-84.
41 Marian L. Smith, Overview of INS History, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT 305, 308 (George T. Kurian ed., 1998).
42 Id. (The INS was charged with investigating and sanctioning corporate
employers who hired illegal immigrants, as well as the deportation of those illegal
immigrants); Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a
Coordinated National Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 386 (2007).
43 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
44 Id. at 383-84.
37
38
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permanent resident status.45 The INS’s main enforcement
function was to detect and remove aliens who had entered the
country illegally or stayed past the expiration of their legal
documents.46 Therefore, searching for terrorists was not the
priority of the INS or its employees.47
The powers of the INS were defined by the INA.48 Since
its enactment in 1952, Congress has amended the INA
numerous times.49 The history of the INA—specifically the
amendments enacted in the last twenty years—demonstrates
the role that the ideals of fighting terrorism and national
security have played in transforming immigration law to
expand the power of immigration officials to find and remove
certain individuals.
For instance, in 1996, following the 1993 bombing of the
World Trade Center and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing,
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA).50 A reaction to the threat of terrorism,51
the AEDPA broadened the law under which individuals could
be denied entry based on their suspected connections to
terrorism. Previously, the government had the burden of
proving that the individual denied entry or facing deportation
had “personally engaged” in terrorist activity.52 Under the new
Act, admissibility would be denied to any individual who was
Smith, supra note 41, at 308.
Id. An “alien” is “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2006). A “nonimmigrant” is “[a]n alien who seeks temporary
entry to the United States for a specific purpose.” Definition of Terms, DEP’T
HOMELAND
SEC.
(Sept.
10,
2009),
http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/
stdfdef.shtm#0. This note will use the word “alien” interchangeably with “noncitizen.”
See COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASSOC., REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
1-6 n.10 (2010) [hereinafter ABA REPORT], available at http://new.abanet.org/
Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.pdf.
47 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 81.
48 See REGINA GERMAIN, AILA’S ASYLUM PRIMER 24 (6th ed. 2010).
49 See Smith, supra note 41, at 305-08 (summarizing enactment of
immigration legislation from the late 1800s to the present); Public Laws Amending the
INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVC
M1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190a
RCRD&CH=publaw (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
50 FARNAM, supra note 6, at 22-23.
51 Perhaps foreshadowing the legislative response to the September 11
attacks, AEDPA was enacted primarily in the shadow of the Oklahoma City Bombing.
COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 21, at 132. Immediately following the attack, “Members
of Congress . . . felt tremendous pressure to pass antiterrorism legislation. It did not
matter that the proposals in the president’s initial bill were directed largely against
international terrorism, while the Oklahoma bombing was the work of homegrown
criminals.” Id.
52 Id. at 143.
45
46
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found to be “a representative” or a “member” of a terrorist
organization.53 Thus, the new law took away the requirement of
individual responsibility and instead denied entry to
individuals based merely on their suspected associations with
terrorist groups.54
Following the passage of the AEDPA, Congress passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)55 to more forcefully address the problem of
illegal immigration into the United States,56 which was linked
to terrorism. “IIRIRA was a major overhaul of the entire INA”57
that “drastically changed the landscape of immigration law.”58
The IIRIRA made significant changes to immigration
enforcement both at the borders and in the country’s interior.
In particular, the Act authorized the Attorney General to

53 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104132, § 411, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV-V)).
54 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 21, at 143 (arguing that AEDPA substituted
the requirement of a “personal connection to terrorist activity” for “guilt by
association,” which is otherwise prohibited by the First Amendment).
55 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1101) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
56 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 95 (1997). In its report on the history of the
enactment of the IIRIRA, the Judiciary Committee characterized the state of illegal
immigration, at the time, as such:

[M]ore than 4 million illegal aliens resided in the United States at the start of
the 104th Congress, with an average net increase each year of 300,000;
approximately half of these illegal residents had arrived with legal temporary
visas and had overstayed; each year, tens of thousands of illegal aliens were
ordered deported but were not removed from the United States due to lack of
resources and legal loopholes; and the legal immigration system failed to
unite nuclear families promptly, encouraged the “chain migration” of
extended families, and admitted the vast majority of immigrants without
regard to their level of education, job skills, or language preparedness.
Id. The Committee further noted that the immigration laws prior to the IIRIRA,
[C]ontributed to the problems we now face by failing to set clear priorities for
our immigration system, and failing to provide tough sanctions against those
who violate our immigration laws. In addition, these laws failed to treat
migration as a comprehensive phenomenon, and failed to make the tough
choices on priorities that would restore credibility both to our systems of
admitting legal immigrants and deterring, apprehending, and removing
illegal immigrants. More fundamentally, the law failed to provide adequate
resources and enforcement tools to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to carry out its critical functions.
Id.
57 Scott Aldworth, Note, Terror Firma: The Unyielding Terrorism Bar in the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1159, 1167 (2010).
58 FARNAM, supra note 6, at 30.
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substantially increase the number of border patrol agents,59
install additional physical barriers and roads in the vicinity of
the U.S. border, and buy any additional equipment necessary
to stop illegal immigration.60 Further, the IIRIRA included
changes to the procedures for inspecting, detaining, and
removing aliens.61 For example, the Act established “expedited
removal,” under which an individual in certain circumstances
could be deported without judicial review,62 and mandated the
detention of individuals facing expedited removal.63
Thus, even before September 11, Congress responded to
the fear of terrorism by targeting illegal immigration—it
expanded the money and resources given to the INS, broadened
the definition of which individuals could be deported and
denied entry, and removed judicial review for deportation
proceedings in certain cases. After September 11, the perceived
tie between immigration and terrorism became even stronger,
and Congress and the President responded accordingly.
B.

Immigration Law after September 11, 2001

In 2005, “The 9/11 Commission Report” was released to
the public.64 The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
59 IIRIRA § 101(a). Specifically, IIRIRA states that “[t]he Attorney General in
each of fiscal years 1997 . . . [–] 2001 shall increase by not less than 1,000 the number
of positions for full-time, active-duty border patrol agents within the Immigration and
Naturalization Service.” Id.
60 Id. § 102(a).
61 Id.
tit. III.; see also FARNAM, supra note 6, at 30-31
(“IIRIRA . . . implement[ed] changes in border control, document fraud dealings,
admissibility procedures, removal processes, asylum and refugee law, with implications
for international students, and visas and consular procedures in general. This law is
perhaps the biggest overhaul of the U.S.’s immigration system since the INA . . . .”).
62 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006); see Ebba Gebisa, Comment, Constitutional
Concerns with the Enforcement and Expansion of Expedited Removal, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 565, 565-66; see also FARNAM, supra note 6, at 36 (“Much of the controversy
surrounding IIRIRA had to do with its expanded grounds for removal.”); Ayelet Shachar,
The Shifting Border of Immigration Regulation, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 809, 816-19 (2009);
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Policy and Politics of Immigrant Rights, 16 TEMP. POL.
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 387, 389-93 (2007).
63 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). The mandatory detention provision of the
IIRIRA has proven to be one of its most controversial aspects. See generally Nancy
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited
Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2000); see also Lenni B. Benson,
As Old as the Hills: Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV.
11, 12 (2010) (“We use immigration law and detention as a weapon in the law’s
enforcement because we seek to control our border. . . . [O]ur ‘border control’ is person
control and containment.”).
64 Eric Lichtblau, 9/11 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/10/politics/10terror.html?
pagewanted=1&_r=1.
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upon the United States (the Commission), which had been
created by Congress and the President to investigate the
attacks,65 was highly critical of the INS.66 The Commission found
that in the 1990s, the INS was “seriously hampered by outdated
technology and insufficient human resources.”67 As a result, the
Commission concluded, the INS could barely handle its actual
primary functions, much less be prepared to fight terrorism.68
In fact, before September 11, there was no U.S.
government agency whose primary responsibility was
analyzing the travel of foreign nationals to determine any
potential terrorist threat.69 The Commission found this
particularly troubling and noted, “For terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons.”70 In his testimony
before the House Committee on the Judiciary shortly after the
attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft emphasized this point
and stated, “The ability of alien terrorists to move freely across
our borders and operate within the United States is critical to
their capacity to inflict damage on our citizens and facilities.”71
His statement made clear that immigration law would soon
become a tool for detecting criminal terrorist activity.72
The Commission proposed the establishment of a new
agency—the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to
address the deficiencies in the U.S. immigration system that
September 11 made painfully clear.73 The new department
would be a consolidation of the multitude of government
agencies that had previously been tasked, separately, with
homeland security and immigration oversight.74 The hope was
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at XV.
See id. at 383-84. The Commission pointedly noted that, “[T]he routine
operations of our immigration laws—that is, aspects of those laws not specifically
aimed at protecting against terrorism—inevitably shaped al Qaeda’s planning and
opportunities.” Id. at 384.
67 Id. at 80.
68 Id. at 384.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 John D. Ashcroft, A Clear and Present Danger, in RIGHTS VS. PUBLIC
SAFETY AFTER 9/11, at 3, 7 (Amitai Etzioni & Jason H. Marsh eds., 2003).
72 See id. at 4. Ashcroft stated that a goal of the DOJ would be to increase the
authority of the INS, as part of broader changes in “law enforcement.” He thus placed
the changes to immigration policy within the larger context of improving criminal law
enforcement. See id. at 4-7.
73 See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY (2002) [hereinafter DHS PROPOSAL], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf.
74 ELIZABETH C. BORJA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. HISTORY OFFICE, BRIEF
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 3 (2008)
[hereinafter DHS BRIEF HISTORY], available at www.hsdl.org/?view&did=37027
65
66
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that one department “that has no question about either its
mission or its authority,”75 along with one “comprehensive
national strategy” for fighting terrorism, would be better able to
secure the nation.76
Thus, in November of 2002, President George W. Bush
signed into law the Homeland Security Act of 2002,77 which
established the DHS and directed that the Secretary of
Homeland Security would run the department.78 Unlike the
INS, the DHS had the primary purpose of fighting terrorism.79
The U.S. Government manual states that the DHS “leads the
unified national effort to secure America. It will prevent and
deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to
threats and hazards to the Nation. The Department will ensure
safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and
visitors, and promote the free-flow of commerce.”80 By its own
mandate, the goal of the country’s main immigration authority
is to fight terrorism first and to welcome immigrants second.81
The DHS was created to unify the various immigration
and homeland security functions that had previously been
spread across different agencies.82 Thus, the immigration
departments of the DHS each have a specific function that
combines immigration and law enforcement. These departments
include the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), which establishes and administers immigration and

(“Before the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, homeland
security activities were spread across more than 40 federal agencies and an estimated
2,000 separate Congressional appropriations accounts.”).
75 DHS PROPOSAL, supra note 73, at 5.
76 DHS BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 74, at 4.
77 Id. at 7.
78 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101-02, 116 Stat.
2135 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 111-12 (2012)).
79 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 228 (2009-10),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/gmanual/browse-gm-09.html; FARNAM, supra
note 6, at 53 (“Since 9/11 . . . the priority of the United States government and the
agencies that control immigration in this country . . . is protection.”).
80 U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, supra note 79, at 226.
81 In the section defining the mission of DHS, the Homeland Security Act of
2002 lists first and foremost that “[t]he primary mission of the Department is
to . . . prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.” Pub. L. No. 107-296,
§ 101(b)(1); see also ABA REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-5 (“DHS serves both an
enforcement function . . . and a service function . . . .”).
82 DHS BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 74, at 3. For a list of the agencies that
became part of DHS, see History: Who Became Part of the Department?, DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm (last visited
Jan. 24, 2012).
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naturalization policy;83 the United States Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), which is responsible for securing the
borders;84 and the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), which enforces immigration laws in the
country’s interior.85 Specifically, the CBP conducts inspections
of arriving people and goods at ports of entries and is charged
with “deterrence or apprehension of illegal immigrations
between ports of entry.”86 Further, the Border Patrol is
responsible for securing both the country’s international land
borders with Canada and Mexico, as well as the United States’s
coastal borders.87 The ICE, on the other hand, is charged with
conducting investigations in the country’s interior, as well as with
the detention and removal of noncitizens.88 The three agencies
work together to conduct the removal proceedings for noncitizens:
the CBP and the ICE initially determine which individuals should
be subject to removal proceedings, while the USCIS conducts the
proceedings to determine whether these individuals should be
granted legal status to remain in the United States.89
Additionally, after the September 11 attacks, Congress
significantly increased the number of personnel and funds
available to immigration authorities in every state along the
northern border.90 In the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Congress
appropriated “such sums as may be necessary” to triple the
number of Border Patrol personnel, Customs Service personnel,
and INS inspectors.91 Further, the PATRIOT Act appropriates
an additional $50,000,000 to both the INS and the U.S.

83 “USCIS is responsible for immigration benefit services . . . .” ABA REPORT,
supra note 46, at 1-8. However, like the other DHS organizations, it is still tasked
primarily with security enforcement. Id. at 1-8 n.35.
84 FARNAM, supra note 6, at 50.
85 OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL
REPORT: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, at 1 (2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_08.pdf.
86 Id. (emphasis added).
87 Id. According to DHS, CBP secures over 9000 miles of land, including
“approximately 7,000 miles of international land border with Canada and Mexico and
2,000 miles of coastal border.” Id.
88 ABA REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-9.
89 Id.
90 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 40102, 115 Stat. 272, 342-43 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.,
15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 49 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C.).
91 Id. § 402(1)-(3).
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Customs Service to improve and acquire any technology and
equipment necessary to monitor the northern border.92
Since its creation in 2003,93 the CBP has grown into a
major government operation. It currently employs more than
20,000 Border Patrol agents and has officers at more than 330
ports of entry.94 Further, the agency received $10.1 billion in
funding for fiscal year 2010.95 More than $2 billion has been
appropriated to border security, including personnel,
infrastructure, and technology.96 These figures indicate that as
the perceived link between immigration and terrorism has
grown, Congress and the President have increased funds,
personnel, and support to the DHS. That support has directly led
to the expanded use of random document checks of passengers
traveling domestically on public transportation.
C.

Internal Document Checks

Policing immigration has become one of the government’s
primary methods for fighting terrorism and providing national
security.97 Border Patrol agents have broad statutory authority
to conduct investigations of individuals they suspect to be in
violation of immigration laws. Currently, under the INA,
immigration officials do not need a warrant to “interrogate any
alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to
remain in the United States,”98 arrest any alien they see
illegally entering the United States or who they believe is in
the country illegally and “is likely to escape before a warrant

Id. § 402(4).
Timeline, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://nemo.cbp.gov/opa/
timeLine_04212011.swf (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
94 Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet,
CBP.GOV (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_
overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml.
95 COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FACT
SHEET: FY 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS: BORDER SECURITY, available at
http://democrats.appropriations.house.gov/images/stories/pdf/dhs/Appropriations_Fact_
Sheet_-_Border_Security_Supplemental.pdf.
96 Id.
97 See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric
Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 509 (2007)
(“Perhaps no single development better exemplifies the public association of
immigration and terrorism than the transfer of immigration functions to a Department
whose defining mission is counter-terrorism.”); Demleitner, supra note 3, at 9-12
(“[I]mmigration-related activities have been prosecuted as criminal violations but
justified as anti-terrorism measures. . . . It was 9/11 that made immigration . . . a
national security issue.”).
98 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2006).
92
93
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can be obtained for his arrest,”99 and “to board and search for
aliens any vessel . . . and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance,
or vehicle” within a reasonable distance of a U.S. border.100
Beyond the border or its “functional equivalent,” however,
immigration officials must have at least reasonable suspicion
to warrant an inquiry or a search.101 Nonetheless, following the
general expansion of authority after the September 11 attacks,
CBP agents have utilized this statutory grant of power to
conduct random interrogations of passengers traveling
domestically within the United States—that is, not at the
border or its functional equivalent.102
CBP agents conduct inspections by boarding domestic
trains, buses, and ferries traveling along domestic routes
(meaning the vessels never cross the border) and inquiring
about passengers’ immigration status.103 At any given time, at
least six uniformed officers, all armed, may board the vessel
and—with no preface and no outright indication that the
passenger may refuse to give their consent—ask passengers
whether they are U.S. citizens.104 As one journalist observed,
passengers “startled from sleep, simply stared, and the agents
prompted them: ‘State your citizenship for me, please, sir.
What country were you born in?’”105 Border Patrol agents
request the immigration documents of any passengers who are
not U.S. citizens.106 Passengers without their documents are
removed from the train and detained for further investigation
and questioning, in full view of the other passengers.107
Though this practice is not widely publicized,108 it is
actually quite large in scope. In August 2010, Nina Bernstein of
Id. § 1357(a)(2).
Id. § 1357(a)(3). See infra Part II.A (discussing how the INS has defined
“reasonable distance”).
101 See infra Part II.A (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of this
statute as it applies to roving patrols at the border and beyond).
102 See infra Part II.B (arguing that the area where transportation checks
occur does not fall under the definition of the “functional equivalent” of the border).
103 Bernstein, supra note 8; Emily Bazar, Some Travelers Criticize Border
Patrol
Inspection
Methods,
USA TODAY
(Oct.
2,
2008,
1:08
AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-30-border-patrol-inside_N.htm; BranchBrioso, supra note 8.
104 Nina Bernstein, When the Border Patrol Comes Aboard, N.Y. TIMES CITY
ROOM BLOG (Aug. 30, 2010, 10:04 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/
when-the-border-patrol-comes-aboard [hereinafter Bernstein II].
105 Id.; see also NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
106 Bernstein, supra note 8.
107 Bernstein II, supra note 104.
108 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 7; see also Bernstein, supra note 8
(noting that “[d]omestic transportation checks are not mentioned in a report on” CBP’s
“northern border strategy”).
99

100
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the New York Times reported that each year, as a result of
these transportation checks, hundreds of passengers on trains
and buses traveling along the northern border are taken to
detention—and placed in removal proceedings—because they
do not have “satisfactory immigration papers” with them.109
Bernstein further suggested that such stops account for about
3000 arrests based on immigration violations each year.110 In
2008, in a similar report regarding transportation checks on
domestic trains, buses, and ferries, USA Today reported that
transportation checks in CBP’s Buffalo sector resulted in the
arrest of 1786 illegal immigrants.111 In the agency’s New Orleans
sector, 1754 illegal aliens were arrested on bus checks.112
These internal transportation checks have been “fueled
by . . . an expanding definition of border jurisdiction”113 and
justified primarily as a security measure to prevent
terrorism.114 Further, immigration officials argue such checks
are necessary on transportation near the border, because
illegal immigrants would flee deeper into the interior after
entering.115 The problem with this argument, however, is that
CBP agents are boarding domestic carriers that have not
crossed the border. The vast majority of those arrested and
detained had resided in the United States for years—some had
overstayed their visa status, were in the process of changing
their status, or had actually been granted legal status
already.116 Nancy Morawetz, a leading immigration scholar who
Bernstein, supra note 8.
Id.
111 Emily Bazar, Border Patrol Expands Transportation Checks, USA TODAY
(Oct. 1, 2008, 12:35 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-30-borderpatrol-checks_N.htm. The Buffalo sector covers about 400 miles of border. Id.
112 Id. The New Orleans sector covers seven states. Id.
113 Bernstein, supra note 8; see also Shachar, supra note 62, at 811-19
(arguing that expedited removal is an example of how the definition of the “border” is
changing—becoming “malleable and movable”—and “blurring the line between the
perimeter and the interior”).
114 “‘Our mission is to defend the homeland, primarily against terrorists and
terrorist weapons,’” said the immigration official in charge of the Border Patrol station
in Rochester, NY, where 1040 people were arrested in 2008, “95% of them from buses
and trains.” Bernstein, supra note 8.
115 A supervisory agent in Washington, D.C. explained CBP’s policy by stating
that, “If you have someone attempting to illegally enter the United States, it’s very
unlikely that they’re going to stay 15 yards from the international border . . . . We want
to take a layered approach.” Bazar, supra note 103 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Similarly, an immigration official in Washington State argued that, “The first line of
defense is on the immediate border . . . . We have to have a second line of defense.”
Bazar, supra note 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-11. The report further states that “Less
than 1 percent of those arrested had entered the United States within the last 72 hours.” Id.
at 10; see also Nadja Drost, Heighted Security at U.S.-Canada Border Catching Few Terror
109
110
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supervises the NYU Immigrant Rights Clinic and is one of the
authors of the NYCLU report, argues that while the expansion
of the CBP’s authority was meant to deal with “border
security,” it has actually become “interior enforcement to sweep
up farmworkers and students.”117
Such document checks have questionable utility for fighting
terrorism as well. As a CBP public affairs officer stated, “If you look
at our apprehensions, a small percentage have anything to do with
terrorism . . . .”118 Ninety percent of the CBP’s prosecutions in 2008
were for immigration—not criminal—violations.119 Thus, the
government cannot justify transportation checks on domestic
carriers either on the ground of detecting terrorism or finding
illegal immigrants attempting to flee the border.
II.

SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS AT THE BORDER

Immigration officials have the power to conduct
searches and seizures at the border through a long-standing
exception to the Fourth Amendment known as the “bordersearch exception.”120 Under this doctrine, officials may search
anyone crossing the border or its “functional equivalent”
without a warrant, and in some cases without reasonable
suspicion or probable cause, for the sole reason that those
individuals have entered the country from elsewhere.121 The
Supreme Court has held that interrogations conducted by
immigration officials beyond the border or its “functional
equivalent” are subject to normal Fourth Amendment
requirements: they must be supported by reasonable suspicion
or probable cause, since the reasons for the “border-search
exception” no longer apply.122 In the INA, Congress granted
much broader discretion to immigration officials to stop and
inquire about individuals’ immigration status.123 However, as
the Supreme Court noted in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
Suspects, IMMIGR. WATCH CAN. (Apr. 19, 2009), http://www.immigrationwatchcanada.org/
2009/04/19/heightened-security-at-u-s-canada-border-catching-few-terror-suspects/ (“[A]
Border Patrol agent in upstate New York who did not want his name used due to concern he
could lose his job said most of the immigrants he apprehends haven’t come over the border
recently—they are traveling domestically and have lived here for years in many cases.”).
117 Bernstein, supra note 8.
118 Drost, supra note 116.
119 Id.
120 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20 (1977).
121 See United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 858-59 (5th Cir. 1987); see also
infra Part II.A.
122 See infra Part II.A.
123 See infra Part II.A.
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a case that addresses immigration officials’ investigative power
under the INA, “[N]o Act of Congress can authorize a violation
of the Constitution.”124
A.

The INA and Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment at
the Border

Since the First Act of Congress, legislators and the
Supreme Court have granted broad leeway to officers searching
people, cars, or objects that have just entered the country.125 In
1789, Congress stated that nothing beyond “suspicion” was
necessary to examine items crossing the border.126 This leeway
has been termed the “border-search exception” to the Fourth
Amendment bar against “unreasonable searches and
seizures.”127 As the Supreme Court explained while officially
upholding the exception in United States v. Ramsey, a border
search is “reasonable” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment for “the single fact that the person or item in
question had entered into our country from outside.”128 Thus, an
individual entering the country from outside should expect to be
searched and should therefore have a lesser expectation of
privacy.129 Further, vehicles may be searched without a warrant
when they cross “an international boundary because of national
self-protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (“[I]t shall be lawful for
the . . . officer of the customs, after entry made of any goods, wares or merchandise, on
suspicion of fraud, to open and examine . . . any package or packages thereof . . . [I]f
any of the packages so examined be found to differ in their contents from the entry, and
it shall appear that such difference hath been made with intention to defraud the
revenue, then all the goods, wares or merchandise contained in such package or
packages, shall be forfeited . . . .”).
126 Id.
127 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619-20 (1977).
128 Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
129 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539 (1985)
(citations omitted) (“[T]he expectation of privacy [is] less at the border than in the
interior . . . .”); see also Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 618 (The Court affirmed that there is no
warrant requirement for a border search because “a port of entry is not a traveler’s
home. . . . Customs officials characteristically inspect luggage and their power to do so
is not questioned . . . ; it is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding
illegal articles from the country.” (quoting United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted))); United States v.
Espericueta-Reyes, 631 F.2d 616, 622 (1980) (noting that “[t]he power to detain persons
at the border while their possessions are searched derives from the nation’s right to
regulate who and what may enter the Country”); Border Searches and the Fourth
Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968) (explaining that one of the justifications
for the border search exception is that because “the individual crossing a border is on
notice that certain types of searches are likely to be made, his privacy is arguably less
invaded by those searches”).
124
125
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identify himself as entitled to come in.”130 Probable cause (much
less a warrant) is therefore not a requirement for a search
conducted at the border.131
Searches that occur at the “functional equivalent” of the
border also fall under the border-search exception.132 The
functional equivalent of the border is an area where most
individuals have just crossed the border so the justifications for
the exception still apply.133 The functional equivalent could
include, for example, “an established station near the border, at
a point marking the confluence of two or more roads that extend
from the border,” or an airplane arriving in the United States on
a nonstop flight from Mexico.134 The exception to the Fourth
Amendment applies at the “functional equivalent” of the border
for the same reason as it applies at the border: for the “single
fact” that an individual has entered the country from outside.135
Additionally, at a traffic checkpoint located reasonably
close to the border, police officers may conduct a “stop[] and
questioning” without reasonable, individualized suspicion or
probable cause.136 Although this is looser than typical Fourth
Amendment requirements, the rule is again based on the
closeness of the search to the border; in upholding it, the
Supreme Court argued that the government interest in
preventing illegal aliens from using highways to quickly get
away from the border outweighed the private interest in
privacy.137 Further, the Court reasoned that defendants have a
decreased expectation of privacy at a traffic checkpoint as
compared to their homes,138 and government agents subject
them to less fright or annoyance than when a roving patrol
stops them, because the government agents ask individuals
only a few questions, and they can see that other vehicles are
also getting stopped and questioned.139
When searches are conducted beyond the border,
however, the Supreme Court has held that more information is
needed to stop, question, and search individuals. Officers in
roving patrols beyond the border or its functional equivalent
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
See United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 960, 965 (1974).
Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 858 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562 (1976).
See id. at 556-57.
Id. at 558-62 (citations omitted).
Id. at 557-58 (citations omitted).
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can only stop and question vehicles when they have “specific
articulable facts . . . that reasonably warrant suspicion that the
vehicle[] contain[s] [illegal] aliens.”140 Further, police officers in
roving patrols or checkpoints beyond the border or its
functional equivalent may not search a vehicle without
probable cause or consent.141
The INA, however, does not have these same
requirements of reasonable suspicion or probable cause. It
eliminates the warrant requirement and authorizes immigration
officials to “interrogate” anyone believed to be an alien about his
or her immigration status.142 Additionally, “within a reasonable
distance from” a United States border, officials may board and
search “any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle” for
illegal immigrants.143 The INS had further defined reasonable
distance as “within 100 air miles from any external boundary
of the United States.”144 Despite this language, the Supreme
Court has held that when immigration officials conduct
searches beyond the border or its functional equivalent, the
investigation must be supported by reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, or consent.145
For example, when a roving patrol stopped and
questioned passengers in a car “on a California road that lies at
all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border,” the
Court held that this stop was of a “wholly different sort” than
an investigation that occurs at the border or its functional
equivalent.146 Even though the government was backed by the
140 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). Reviewing
courts, in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion, look at the “totality of
the circumstances” of each case. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
(citations omitted). Under this analysis, courts look at whether the officer had a
“‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing,” id., taking into
account the officer’s experience and training, including an immigration official’s
experience with particular routes used by illegal aliens and the official’s “experience as
a border patrol agent.” See id. at 277 (citations omitted).
Further, an individual’s Mexican ancestry alone does not provide such
facts and is therefore an illegal reason to stop and question an individual, although
Mexican appearance is a “relevant factor.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87.
141 See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (holding that, because
of the significant invasion of privacy in searching private cars, “at traffic checkpoints
removed from the border and its functional equivalents, officers may not search private
vehicles without consent or probable cause”); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82;
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 267-68, 274-75 (1973) (holding that a
warrantless search conducted by roving patrol on a road that never intersects the
Mexican border, with no probable cause justification, violates the Fourth Amendment).
142 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (2006).
143 Id. § 1357(a)(3).
144 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2) (2010).
145 See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272-73; Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
146 Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
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INA, the Court stated, specifically in response to their use of
the statute, “[N]o Act of Congress can authorize a violation of
the Constitution.”147 The Court held the search of passengers in
a vehicle that never intersected the border unconstitutional
without probable cause, even though the INA, on its face,
authorized the stop.148 Similarly, transportation checks
conducted on domestic common carriers are unconstitutional
because the vessels never cross the border and are therefore
not subject to the “border-search exception.”
B.

Domestic Document Checks Do Not Fall Under the
Border-Search Exception

Like the Supreme Court, Congress and the DHS have
argued that certain measures, inapplicable in the country’s
interior, are necessary at the border. In passing the expedited
removal and mandatory detention provisions of the IIRIRA, the
House Judiciary Committee argued, “If not detained, the aliens
would most often disappear and become long-term illegal
residents.”149 Further, in explaining the expansion of the
expedited removal program, the DHS stated that its focus was
on “unlawful entries that have a close spatial and temporal
nexus to the border”—meaning that this expanded authority is
necessary, “because many aliens will arrive in vehicles that
speedily depart the border area, and because other recent
arrivals will find their way to near-border locales seeking
transportation to other locations within the interior of the
U.S.”150 These policies arose because of the belief that more
stringent requirements are necessary at the border to prevent
aliens who have just entered from fleeing. The government’s
explanation of its actions reflects an understanding that there
is something different about individuals who have just entered
the country from outside.
The government has justified the document checks on
public transportation on similar grounds.151 However, the
justification is incongruent with the actual practice. The
passengers are questioned while traveling on trains and buses

Id. at 272.
Id. at 272-73.
149 H.R. REP. NO. 104-879, at 98 (1997).
150 Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,879
(Aug. 11, 2004).
151 See supra Part I.C.
147
148
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that have only domestic routes.152 Though they are traveling
within one hundred miles of the border, they have not recently
crossed the border. Moreover, they are not at the “functional
equivalent” of the border, because they have not entered the
country from outside—and there is no reason to suspect that
they have, since a train or bus traveling domestically never
intersects with another country. When the Court gave
examples of what may constitute the “functional equivalent” of
the border, it provided areas where the majority of the
individuals have recently entered the country from
elsewhere.153 Thus, the individuals stopped during the
transportation checks should have the same expectation of
privacy as any individual in the interior of the United States.
Moreover, the argument that these vessels may contain illegal
aliens attempting to flee into the country’s interior is weak,
again, because these vehicles have not come from across the
border.
III.

POLICE QUESTIONING OF INDIVIDUALS

The random questioning has also been justified by the
general Fourth Amendment principle that a police officer may
approach an individual in a public place and ask that person
questions—without any requirement of a warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion—as long as “a reasonable person
would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate.”154
The encounter becomes a “seizure” that implicates the Fourth
Amendment if the individual questioned believes that he or she
is not free to walk away.155 The conduct of immigration officials
on domestic carriers is coercive and therefore a “seizure” under
the Fourth Amendment. As long as CBP agents continue their
interrogations without reasonable suspicion or probable cause,
they are conducting illegal seizures in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.

See Bernstein, supra note 8.
See Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273.
154 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991); see also INS v. Delgado, 466
U.S. 210, 215 (1984) (citations omitted).
155 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (stating
that “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has ‘seized’ that person”).
152
153
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Defining a “Seizure”

As the Supreme Court noted in Florida v. Royer,156 no
“litmus-paper test” determines whether a consensual encounter
or a seizure has occurred.157 Instead, courts look at the totality
of the circumstances and decide whether, based on all the
circumstances, a “reasonable person would have believed he
was not free to leave.”158 This is not a question of the subjective
experience of the individual, but of the objective factors and
what a reasonable person would have concluded from them.159
If the encounter was “so intimidating,”160 or the officer “by
means of physical force or show of authority”161 has indicated
that the individual is not free to leave, then a “seizure” has
occurred within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.162
Courts have looked at a variety of factors in determining
whether a “seizure” has occurred. In United States v.
Mendenhall, the Supreme Court articulated several specific
factors that may indicate officers’ behavior is coercive and
constitutes a seizure.163 These factors include “the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer . . . or the use of language or tone of voice indicating
that” an individual’s compliance is required.164 Further, the
Court has held that “[t]he cramped confines of a bus are one
relevant factor that” could be used to determine whether the
individual being questioned felt that he was free to leave.165
If, in fact, a seizure has occurred, the officers must have
“reasonable, articulable suspicion” to justify it166—even if the
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Royer, 460 U.S. at 506-07; see also Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)
(noting that the Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules” in determining
whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, “instead emphasizing
the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry”).
158 Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216; see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S.
544, 554 (1980).
159 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
160 Id. at 216 (majority opinion).
161 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
162 See id.; accord Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (“As long as the person to
whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there
has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the
Constitution require some particularized and objective justification.”).
163 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
164 Id. at 554.
165 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (The Court noted, however, the
fact that the questioning took place on a bus, by itself, is not dispositive.); see also
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002).
166 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983). In his concurrence to Royer,
Justice Brennan argued that any time a uniformed police officer approaches an
156
157
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seizure at issue is “only a brief detention.”167 This reasonable
suspicion standard requires the officer to show specific facts,
“which, taken together with rational inferences,” would
“reasonably warrant” the seizure.168 Further, even if the officer
has specific facts to justify the seizure, the officer’s conduct is
still limited in scope: the officer’s actions must be “reasonably
related in scope to the justification” for the seizure.169 With
these rules, the Court has tried to limit police intrusion into
individual privacy in an effort to balance important
government interests with the individual interests in privacy
protected by the Fourth Amendment.170
In a few illustrative cases, the Court has applied this
totality of the circumstances test to determine whether a
“seizure” had occurred, with varying results that indicate
changes in policy rather than a consistent application of the
Court’s own principles. For example, in INS v. Delgado,171 INS
agents entered a workplace to look for illegal aliens.172 Agents
were positioned near all of the building’s exits and others
moved throughout the factory asking employees questions.173 If
employees answered “unsatifactor[ily]” or stated that they were
aliens, the agents asked for their immigration documents.174
The Court held that in this situation, a seizure had not occurred;
even though agents were stationed at all the exits, the
individual and requests to see his documents (in this case, the defendant’s airplane
ticket), a seizure has occurred, because “[i]t is simply wrong to suggest that a traveler
feels free to walk away when he has been approached by individuals who have
identified themselves as police officers and asked for, and received, his airline ticket
and driver’s license.” Id. at 512 (Brennan, J., concurring).
167 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551 (citations omitted); see also INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 227 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
an individual’s personal security and privacy from unreasonable interference by the
police, even when that interference amounts to no more than a brief stop and
questioning concerning one’s identity.”).
168 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 551.
169 Terry, 392 U.S. at 29. For example, in Terry, the Supreme Court upheld
the inclusion at trial of a gun that a police officer obtained by frisking the defendant on
the street. The Court held that the personal intrusion was permissible because the
officer’s justification for conducting the search—his and bystanders’ protection—was
limited in scope to a search aimed at discovering instruments that could be used to
assault an officer. Id. at 29-30.
170 See id. at 20-21 (“In order to assess the reasonableness of [the police
officer’s] conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the
constitutionally protected interest of the private citizen, for there is no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize]
against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.” (citations omitted)).
171 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
172 Id. at 212.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 212-13.
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employees could have “simply refused to answer.”175 The agents
were only questioning the employees; this conduct “could hardly
result in a reasonable fear that [employees] were not free to
continue working or to move about the factory.”176 Further, while
employees may have believed they would be questioned if they
tried to leave the building, they should not have reasonably
believed “they would be seized or detained in any meaningful
way” for doing so.177 Therefore, looking at the totality of the
circumstances, the Court concluded that at all times, a
reasonable employee—in a building where INS agents were
walking around and standing near all the exits—should have
felt free to walk away or refuse to answer, and thus, a seizure
had not occurred.178 No reasonable, individualized suspicion
was required to question the individual employees here.179
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, argued instead that,
based on all the objective factors, a seizure had in fact occurred
because “a reasonable person could not help but feel compelled
to stop and provide answers to the INS agents’ questions.”180
Contrary to the majority’s description, the encounter from the
viewpoint of the employees was an intimidating show of
authority that required individualized suspicion.181 The
inspection was a surprise one, carried out by fifteen to twentyfive agents “who moved systematically through the rows of
workers” while showing their badges and asking questions.182
Employees suspected of being illegal aliens were handcuffed and
led away to vans waiting outside, while agents stationed at the
exits could prevent others from escaping questioning.183 Under
these “tactics,” the employees could not possibly have felt they
could refuse to answer the questions and leave.184 The agents

175 Id. at 218. The fact that the inspection occurred at a workplace was also a
factor in the Court’s decision: Justice Rehnquist argued that, at work, individuals have
an obligation to their employers to remain at work—therefore, their freedom of
movement is already somewhat restricted. See id. Additionally, Justice Powell in
concurrence argued that an employee’s “expectation of privacy in the plant
setting . . . certainly is far less than the traditional expectation of privacy in one’s
residence.” See id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring).
176 Id. at 220-21 (majority opinion).
177 Id. at 219.
178 Id. at 212, 220-21.
179 See id. at 221.
180 Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181 Id. at 229-30.
182 Id. at 230.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 230-31.
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therefore needed to have reasonable and particularized suspicion
to question each individual.185
Finally, Justice Brennan articulated an important
distinction for purposes of immigration law—the difference
between a legal and an illegal alien.186 He argued that “the
mere fact that a person is believed to be an alien provides no
immediate grounds for suspecting any illegal activity.”187 In the
context of a large-scale inspection like the one at issue, “it is
virtually impossible to distinguish fairly between citizens and
aliens,” and therefore, the INS needed particularized,
reasonable factors to question individuals suspected of being in
the country illegally, rather than just to question anyone who
may be an alien.188
As hinted at by the dissent, the INS v. Delgado decision
was motivated by the strong public interest in curbing illegal
immigration.189 The show of force was so strong that it is not
reconcilable with the Court’s previously articulated factors in
Mendenhall; no reasonable employee in the situation could
have felt free to refuse the agents’ questions or to leave the
building when officers entered and essentially blocked the
exits. Thus, the public policy interest weighed more strongly
than the individual interest in privacy. While such a balancing
of factors is standard in the Court’s Fourth Amendment
cases,190 it also has a ratcheting effect in that the Court
describes more police encounters as “consensual” rather than
“seizures”—even if the individual feels they have been detained—
as long as the policy interest is strong enough to justify them.

185 Id. at 232-34. Here, there was no individualized suspicion to question
anyone—the INS agents were instructed to interrogate “virtually all persons” in the
factory. Id. at 233. In response, Justice Brennan argued, “To say that such an
indiscriminate policy of mass interrogation is constitutional makes a mockery of the
words of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 234.
186 Id. at 235.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 235-36.
189 See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror:
Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 176-77 n.40 (2009) (“Since a person might not feel free to leave
when the only avenue for leaving a location is blocked by law enforcement officials, the
Supreme Court’s decision in Delgado that individuals caught in the midst of a workplace
inspection by immigration officials were not seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment suggests that the only distinguishing criterion is that the Delgado incident
occurred in the immigration context rather than the traditional criminal law context.”).
190 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In Terry, the particular interest at
issue was the necessity of the police officer to ensure that the individual he was
questioning was not dangerous to himself or the surrounding public. Id. at 23.
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Cases where individuals were stopped during drug
searches illustrate the ratcheting effect. In Florida v. Bostick,191
police officers conducting a drug search on a bus questioned the
defendant without any articulable suspicion and then searched
his belongings with his consent.192 The defendant argued that
in the “cramped confines” of the bus, where police officers
essentially blocked the exits and displayed their badges and
firearms, he did not feel free to refuse consent either to the
questioning or the search of his belongings.193 The Court held
that the mere fact that the encounter took place on a bus did
not constitute a seizure per se.194
This practice was again upheld in United States v.
Drayton,195 where the Court held that police officers conducting
a drug search on a bus are not required to inform passengers of
their right to refuse cooperation.196 In Drayton, because the police
officers did not “brandish” the weapons they were clearly carrying
or “make any intimidating movements,” a reasonable passenger
would have felt free not to cooperate with the police.197 In
particular, the Court held that because the public knows most law
enforcement officers are armed, “[t]he presence of a holstered
firearm thus is unlikely to contribute to the coerciveness of the
encounter absent active brandishing of the weapon.”198
As the dissent pointed out in Bostick, the practice at
issue in these cases occurred within the broader context of the
“War on Drugs.”199 By placing the decision within this
framework, Justice Marshall hinted that the public policy was
an important factor in the majority’s decision and argued that
based on the mere facts alone, a seizure had in fact occurred.200
The dissent asserted that the practice was “intimidating” and
coercive,201 and the presence of the officers was “threatening.”202
When armed and uniformed police officers question passengers
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
Id. at 431-32 (The defendant was carrying cocaine in his luggage and was
therefore arrested.).
193 Id. at 435.
194 Id. at 438-39. The case was remanded to the lower court for a
determination of whether the conduct of the officers in this particular case, based on all
the factors (not just that the encounter occurred on a bus), “communicated to a
reasonable person that” he was free not to consent. Id. at 439-40.
195 536 U.S. 194 (2002).
196 Id. at 206-07.
197 Id. at 203-04.
198 Id. at 205.
199 Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
200 See id. at 440.
201 Id. at 446-47.
202 Drayton, 536 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191
192
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on a bus, effectively blocking the exit, they create “an
atmosphere of obligatory participation” in which a reasonable
person would not feel free to refuse cooperation.203 The dissent
argued that such a seizure requires reasonable suspicion;
without that, such bus sweeps “violate[] the core values of the
Fourth Amendment.”204 Based on the public interest in finding
illegal drugs, the Court in these cases found that a seizure had
not occurred—despite factors that, objectively, appeared to be
exactly those that did require reasonable suspicion in the
Court’s prior opinions.
B.

Internal Document Checks on Domestic Vessels Are an
Illegal Seizure

The internal document checks violate the “core values”
of the Fourth Amendment, because they are conducted without
any reasonable or particularized suspicion.205 In Terry, the
Supreme Court asserted that a seizure occurs when a police
officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority,”206 has
restrained an individual’s freedom to “walk away.”207 Under the
factors articulated in Mendenhall,208 immigration officials
inspecting individual passengers on domestic train and bus routes
display a coercive amount of power and thus, their actions
constitute a seizure. This practice must include reasonable,
particularized suspicion, and it must be limited in scope.
The factors here amount to a coercive practice, where
ordinary individuals do not feel free to refuse to answer.209 Fully
uniformed and armed immigration officials board trains and
buses and ask passengers at random whether they are U.S.
citizens.210 In full view of other passengers, they check
Id. at 212.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 440 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205 See id.
206 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (emphasis added).
207 Id. at 16.
208 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (citations omitted);
see supra Part II.B.
209 In researching this issue for the New York Times, journalist Nina
Bernstein specifically tested whether she could refuse. See Bernstein II, supra note
104. When asked whether she was a citizen, she replied, “I don’t want to answer that
question.” Id. The officers moved on. Id. Bernstein, however, was fully aware of the law
which allows individuals to refuse consent, and, as she herself pointed out, was “a
white woman in jeans who had spoken American English with no accent.” Id. She had
no further evidence of other individuals refusing consent, because they all answered
the officers’ questions. Id.
210 Id. (“[H]alf a dozen men in green uniforms with pistols on their hips strode
down the platform . . . .”).
203
204
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individuals’ immigration documents and passports211 and remove
from the train for further questioning those that do not have
their papers.212 Several immigration officers essentially block the
exits, by standing between the passenger and the doors.213
Moreover, as the dissent pointed out in Bostick, “Because the
bus is only temporarily stationed at a point short of its
destination, the passengers are in no position to leave as a
means of evading the officers’ questioning.”214 The officers also
create an “intimidating atmosphere,” by walking among
passengers and abruptly asking them questions while clearly
armed.215 Taking away passengers in clear sight of others adds
to the officers’ demonstration of authority and power, which
would make it difficult for a reasonable person to believe they
can refuse to answer the officers’ inquiries.216
Further, to determine whether a police practice violates
the Fourth Amendment, courts often balance the government
interest at issue with the private interest in privacy.217 In INS
v. Delgado and the drug search cases, the public interest in
favor of curbing illegal immigration or fighting the war on
drugs, respectively, outweighed the private interest in
privacy.218 The random document checks conducted on domestic
buses and trains are justified primarily by the aim of fighting
terrorism. As demonstrated by changes in immigration law and
congressional spending after the September 11 attacks,
fighting terrorism has become a national priority.219 The
random passenger surveys conducted on domestic vessels are
an outgrowth of those policy changes.

Id.
Id.
213 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 211 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (“The officers took control of the entire passenger compartment . . . . The
reasonable inference was that the ‘interdiction’ was not a consensual exercise . . . .”).
214 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
215 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 230, 234 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“To say that such an indiscriminate policy of mass interrogation is constitutional
makes a mockery of the words of the Fourth Amendment.”); see also NYCLU REPORT,
supra note 9, at 21 (arguing that “when an armed agent questions passengers on a
train or bus, sometimes in the middle of the night with a flashlight glaring at the
rider’s face, few individuals would feel that they have the right to refuse to answer the
agent’s questions”).
216 See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) (“In
delineating the constitutional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court
has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the
individual . . . .” (citations omitted)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
218 See supra Part III.A.
219 See supra Part I.B and C.
211
212
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Although fighting terrorism is vital, it is questionable
whether these types of tactics actually work towards that
goal.220 Most of the arrests that occur as a result of these
document checks are for immigration, not criminal, violations;
a minuscule percentage are at all related to terrorism.221
Fighting terrorism is a critical goal—but it is not accomplished
by these types of random searches.
On the other hand, the potential for private harm is
huge. Individuals who cannot present proper immigration
documents are removed from the train or bus and taken to
detention facilities or local prisons for further questioning and
investigation.222 According to the NYCLU’s Report, the majority
of individuals who were arrested and detained could not be
released without posting a bond, which could range from $1500
to $20,000.223 The Report postulated that as those arrested had
just been traveling, they likely did not have such large
amounts of cash on them and probably had to wait several days
before being released.224 Because the Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of mandatory detention,225 once
these individuals have been detained, they likely have few
legal options that would allow them to be released quickly.
Further, under the INA’s expedited removal provisions, once
they are arrested, certain individuals may even face immediate
deportation without judicial or administrative review of their
case.226 Finally, the “exclusionary rule,” which holds that
evidence found in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be
excluded from actions by the government against an individual,
does not apply to civil deportation hearings.227 Even if
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
See Drost, supra note 116; see also supra Part I.C.
222 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 14-15; see also Bernstein, supra note 8. In
one case, a woman was detained for three weeks before seeing an immigration judge. Id.
223 NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 15.
224 Id.
225 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527-28, 531 (2003) (holding that
Congress can require that individuals be detained during the pendency of their
removal proceedings); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543-44
(1985) (holding that the detention of a suspected alimentary canal smuggler for almost
sixteen hours before inspectors sought a warrant was not unreasonably long).
226 See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c) (2006) for which categories of aliens are subject to
expedited removal. Expedited removal may occur simply by an order issued by an
immigration official. Because of the speed with which it occurs, and the lack of
oversight in the procedure, expedited removal has been heavily criticized as a system
that lacks necessary due process protections and subjects aliens who are legitimately
seeking asylum to the caprice of “low-level immigration inspection officers,” whose
decisions are “unreviewable.” See Gebisa, supra note 62, at 566; see also Wadhia, supra
note 62, at 392.
227 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
220
221
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immigration agents act unlawfully, unlike in an ordinary
criminal trial, any illegal immigrant arrested as a result of an
illegal search will still be subject to deportation.228 Further,
many commentators have raised concerns about whether this
practice amounts to racial profiling.229 Although immigration
agents assert that they randomly question people and do not
base suspects on race, at present no limitations ensure that
racial profiling is not occurring.230
Therefore, although the justification for these
transportation checks is, on its face, without fault, the actual
results have not borne out this justification. Moreover, the risk
of private harm far outweighs the public utility of this practice.
Private individuals that are randomly questioned by this
procedure, if they are noncitizens and not carrying proper
documentation, may be subjected to detention and
deportation—and the possible unlawfulness of the procedure
will not protect them. This is unjust both because many of the
individuals arrested do have lawful status to be in the United
States,231 and because many have been here for long periods of
time and have established ties to the country and the right to
more constitutional protection than someone entering for the
first time.232 Congress and the DHS should both institute
procedures and amendments to ensure that immigration
officials proceed carefully and are limited in their actions.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Congress must act to restrict the practice of randomly
questioning individuals traveling on domestic buses and trains
228 Id. at 1050-51. This is because an immigration violation is considered an
ongoing violation, and the Court has argued that,

Applying the exclusionary rule in proceedings that are intended not to punish
past transgressions but to prevent their continuance or renewal would
require the courts to close their eyes to ongoing violations of the law. This
Court has never before accepted costs of this character in applying the
exclusionary rule.
Id. at 1046.
See NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 7, 16; Bazar, supra note 103.
See NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (“While CBP has refused to
release its training materials on racial and ethnic profiling, accounts of its operations
raise serious concerns that Border Patrol agents resort to racial and ethnic profiling
techniques to determine who to stop, question or arrest. Such accounts indicate that
even if CBP policy expressly forbids racial and ethnic profiling, additional guidance
and training of Border Patrol officers is necessary to ensure appropriate compliance.”)
231 Id. at 6-7.
232 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
229
230
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about their immigration status by amending the INA to define
the parameters of a permissible stop and inquiry more
narrowly. The Supreme Court in United States v. BrignoniPonce233 held that beyond the border or its functional
equivalent, officers in roving patrols can only stop individuals if
they have reasonable suspicion to believe they are illegal
aliens.234 This same standard should be applied to the
transportation checks at issue here. Border Patrol agents must
have reasonable suspicion to stop and question someone on the
train or bus about their immigration status.235
Further, as in Brignoni-Ponce and Terry, the search must
be limited in scope.236 There is a difference between believing
that someone is an alien, an illegal alien, or a terrorist.237 If
immigration agents believe that such transportation checks are
necessary to stop terrorism and to curb illegal immigration, they
must have reasonable suspicion—specifically, articulable facts—
to believe that the individual they are questioning is either a
terrorist or an illegal alien.
The INA itself provides a model for the framing of this
amendment. The INA states that immigration officials have
the authority to “conduct a search, without warrant, of the
person, and of the personal effects in the possession of any
person seeking admission to the United States, concerning
whom such officer or employee may have reasonable cause to
suspect that grounds exist for denial of admission to the United
States.”238 The “reasonable cause” limitation should be added to
the other parts of the statute as well, requiring that officers
may interrogate individuals suspected of being illegal aliens, or
board vessels to search for illegal aliens, only if they have
“reasonable cause” to suspect that the individual is an illegal
alien or a terrorist.
Finally, Congress should act pragmatically when enacting
this amendment by requiring that the DHS train immigration
officials on determining what constitutes reasonable suspicion
and when they may question individuals on suspicion that they
422 U.S. 873 (1975).
Id. at 881-82. Specifically, officers must be “aware of specific articulable facts,
together with rational inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that
the vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.” Id. at 884.
235 See NYCLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 25-26.
236 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968)
(holding that a stop and search inquiry must be “reasonably related in scope to the
justification for [the] initiation”).
237 See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 235 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
238 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2006) (emphasis added).
233
234
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are in the country illegally or are involved in terrorism. In
particular, this training should address the issue of racial
profiling to ensure that the officers’ determinations are based on
more than race.239 This training program can be modeled on the
USCIS Asylum Division Training Section, a “national training
course that is specific to asylum adjudicators.”240 Asylum officers
are required to attend periodic trainings both in national offices
and in their regional offices that educate them on the relevant
asylum law, how to properly adjudicate applications, and
interviewing and writing skills, among other topics.241 Officers are
also required to attend periodic trainings to update their skills
and their knowledge of the field.242
A similar training program can be instituted for Border
Patrol agents who investigate domestic trains and buses. Like
the asylum officers, Border Patrol officers can be required to
learn about Fourth Amendment case law and its proper
application in the field. Further, officers can learn the proper
evidentiary standards required to question passengers and the
factors that may have more relevance to making a decision
about investigating passengers. Officers can also receive
training on questioning passengers in less obtrusive ways.
Although the Border Patrol has recently taken steps to
curb the practice of searching domestic trains and buses for illegal
immigrants, and has stated that it will conduct searches only
when it has information regarding a threat,243 these changes have
not been codified in any formal agency policy, rule, or law.244 To
ensure that long-term changes are made to the practice, Congress
should enact formal changes to the INA, and the DHS should put
in place ongoing training courses for its Border Patrol agents.
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
unreasonable searches and seizures. When immigration officials,
with no articulable reason, question passengers traveling on
domestic train and bus routes about their immigration status,
they violate this fundamental mandate of the U.S. Constitution.
239 See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-87 (stating that an individual’s Mexican
ancestry, alone, does not provide such facts and is therefore an illegal reason to stop and
question an individual, although Mexican appearance is a “relevant factor”).
240 Asylum Division Training Programs, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?
vgnextoid=2a1d1a877b4bc110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=3a82ef
4c766fd010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD (last updated Apr. 12, 2011).
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 NBPC Press Release, supra note 34.
244 U.S. Relaxes Canadian Border Checks as Agents Are Told to Stop
Searching Buses, Trains and Planes for Illegal Immigrants, supra note 32.
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Congress and the DHS must work together to set clearer
limitations on the practice and to train immigration officials in
the proper ways to conduct investigations.
CONCLUSION
In the years following the September 11 terrorist
attacks, immigration became linked with terrorist activity in
the public mind. Congress and the President responded by
enacting policies to curb illegal immigration with the principal
aim of fighting terrorism. In particular, they established one
agency, the DHS, to oversee both immigration and national
security and made explicit the administration’s view that
immigration and terrorism were intricately linked. Congress
also increased funding to the newly-created government
agencies whose purpose became to secure the national borders
in order to fight terrorism.
As a result of these actions, the fear of terrorism and
terrorists has become a fear of illegal immigration, and the
overall climate of fighting illegal immigration has led to a
policy whereby immigration agents board domestic trains and
buses and freely question all passengers regarding their
citizenship and immigration status. This practice has been
justified as a terrorism-fighting measure, but it has not
resulted in the capture of any terrorists. Instead, agents have
arrested students and other individuals who have resided in
the country for years.245
President Barack Obama has argued that individuals
who have been in the United States since they were children
should not be treated in the same way as other illegal
immigrants.246 He supported passage of the Dream Act,
legislation that would have enabled individuals that had been
in the country since childhood and had completed college or
military service in the United States to become citizens.247
Though the bill was defeated in the Senate,248 the official
sanction for such a law demonstrates that not all aliens, who
may technically be illegal, should be treated alike.
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The random interrogation of passengers traveling on
domestic routes unjustifiably subjects them to an
unconstitutional intrusion on their personal privacy. Legislative
and administrative action must limit this practice in its scope.
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